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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
it, is none of the lofty and nebulous considerations given above, but simply a
refusal of the Court to prefer a jury verdict as to the reasonableness of a traffic
plan to the considered decision of an expert government body which, under
the evidence adduced at the trial, carefully executed a traffic safety plan which
operated without a hitch for over three years previous to the accident which
it allegedly caused.
Whatever the reasoning behind the decision in the instant case, the chaos
in this section of the law should give one pause before relying on it as binding
precedent in any but an identical fact situation.

PROPERTY
REQUIREMENTS FOR COVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND

In Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp.,' the plaintiff and defendant's
predecessor in title entered into an agreement whereby the latter was to supply
steam heat to a building on the plaintiff's property and to furnish and maintain
pipes for that purpose. Plaintiff agreed to pay $50.00 yearly and allow the
defendant's predecessor to build a spur track across his land. The agreement
provided that it applied to the heirs and assignees of the parties. For twentyseven years, the defendant's predecessor provided the heat in fulfillment of
its covenant. In 1956, a series of conveyances took place which formed the
basis of the present action. The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the
original covenantor, The Embossing Co. (defendant's predecessor in title), had
contracted to sell its land to an agent of the defendant, who agreed to assume
the obligation to supply heat. He, in turn, assigned the contract of sale to
another agent of defendant, who also assumed the burden of the covenant to
provide heat, and to whom the land was deeded as grantee. Subsequently, the
land was reconveyed, this time to the defendant, in an agreement making no
mention of the obligation to provide heat. Upon the defendant's refusal to
perform the covenant, the plaintiff brought an action for specific performance
and damages. The defendant contended that the action had become academic,
since the plaintiff had sold his own land to the defendant. The Court of
Appeals, although agreeing that the question of specific performance was moot,
held that the plaintiff might properly litigate the question of damages.
The Appellate Division affirmed an order of the Supreme Court dismissing
the plaintiff's complaint, holding that the covenant to supply heat was not one
which may run with the land, since it was affirmative in nature.2 The Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that the covenant ran with the land and so was
enforceable against a subsequent grantee. In addition, the Court held that the
assumption agreement between The Embossing Co. and defendant's alleged
1. 7 N.Y.2d 240, 196 N.YS.2d 945 (1959).
2. 6 A.D.2d 627, 180 N.Y.S.2d 535 (3d Dep't 1958).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
agents constituted a third-party creditor beneficiary contract, which the
plaintiff may enforce. In deciding the case on alternative grounds, the Court
indicated the possibility of relitigation on the covenant aspect of the decision,
if the plaintiff fails to show an agency relationship between the successive
grantees of the burdened land, as it alleged in its complaint.
The claim that the covenant ran with the land was most emphasized by
the Court as the basis for its decision. The Court first cites the general rule
in New York, that affirmative covenants, i.e. ones requiring the parties to do
positive acts concerning the land, do not run with the land so as to bind
successive grantees to their performance. This rule, however, has significant
exceptions. In Neponsit v. Industrial Savings Bank,3 the Court held that an
affirmative covenant will be enforced against subsequent grantees, when the
rights which normally flow from the ownership of land are substantially affected, i.e. rights unique to each individual landowner. There are, in addition,
a number of other New York decisions in which covenants clearly affirmative in
4
nature were held to run with the land.
The Court then indicates that the burden of affirmative covenants may be
enforced against subsequent grantees of the originally burdened land when it
appears that "(1) the original covenantor and covenantee intended such a
result; (2) there has been a continuous succession of conveyances between
the original covenantor and the party now sought to be burdened and (3) the
covenant touches and concerns the land to a substantial degree."S The Court
dismissed the first two as essentials clearly present. It then argues that the
third, the Neponsit test, was met since the plaintiff had, as the original covenantee, the right to have heat supplied to his building as long as both it, and
the building on the covenantor's land which was the source of the heat, were
standing and in use. In addition, the right was unique to him, and one not
running to other land owners in general, with the covenant imposing a like
burden to supply heat upon the Embossing Co. and its assignees. Thus, the
rights of the two parties in the enjoyment of their land were substantially
affected, as the Neponsit test requires.
Although the Court here acknowledges a rule with notable exceptions,
these exceptions are in keeping with the rationale of that rule. It is the Court's
concern with the burdensome nature of affirmative covenants that is the basis
of the New York rule against the running of these covenants with the land.
The Court here stated, that since the covenant, by its terms, runs with the
land only as long as both buildings are standing and in use, the covenant did
not impose such an onerous burden on the title that alienation would be unduly
3. 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938).
4. Morgan Lake Co. v. N.Y., N.H. &H. R.R. Co., 262 N.Y. 234, 186 N.E. 685 (1933);
Greenfarb v. RS.X. Realty Corp., 256'N.Y. 130, 175 N.E. 649 (1931); Moxley v. NJ. &
N.Y.R.R. Co, 143 N.Y. 649, 37 N.E. 824 (1894).
5. Supra note 1 at 245, 196 N.Y.S.2d 949-950 (1959).
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restricted. Thus, the Court indicates that affirmative covenants may run with
the land when their duration is limited in time.
The Court dismisses the second essential required for a covenant to run
with the land, i.e. that there be a continuous succession of conveyances between
the original covenantor and the party now sought to be burdened, without
discussion, although it presents some rather grave questions. In New York,
for a covenant to run with the land at law, there has been traditionally required
a "privity of estate" between the original covenantor and covenantee, upon
which the covenant must rest. Privity of estate has been variously defined,
but the term at least connotes a mutual or successive relationship to the same
rights of property or interests therein.7 For the privity requirement to be
fulfilled, New York courts have held that there must be a conveyance of an
interest in land, by the covenantor to the covenantee, or vice versa, at the time
the covenant is made.8 A grant, by the owner of land, of an interest such as
an easement will satisfy the requirement of privity of estate, and thus allow a
covenant between the grantor and the grantee to run at lawY In the instant
case, the Court makes no mention of the requirement of this type of privity of
estate. Although it is possible that the Court assumed that the right of way
granted for the spur track under the original agreement was an easement, this
point would seem to have merited further discussion by the Court. This is so,
because if the grant of a right to run a spur track across the plaintiff's land
was only a license, this would not create privity of estate between the covenantor
and covenantee, and any covenant resting upon such a license could not run at
law so as to bind subsequent grantees. New York courts are not bound by the
characterization given a grant by the agreeing parties,' 0 but rather will make
their determination by viewing the actual effect of the grant."- Thus the
courts will consider the duration of the right granted, and its extent.' 2 If the
right is irrevocable, and of the type that can be created as an easement, it will
be capable of satisfying the privity requirement.' 3 In the instant case, the
agreement provided for a right of way for a spur railroad track, which is commonly the subject of an easement. However, whether this was an easement, or
a mere license as indicated by the language of the agreement which speaks
in terms of consent, rather than grant, was not discussed by the Court. Thus,
the question whether the requirement of privity of estate was satisfied is left
in doubt.
6.
24 N.E.
7.
8.

Cole v. Hughes, 54 N.Y. 444, 13 Am. Rep. 611 (1873) ; Nye v. Hoyle, 120 N.Y. 195,
1 (1890). See also, Neponsit v. Industrial Savings Bank, supra note 3.
Mygatt v. Coe, 124 N.Y. 212, 126 N.E. 611 (1891).
Lawrence v. Whitney, 115 N.Y. 410, 22 N.E. 174 (1889); Harsha v. Reid, 45 N.Y.

415 (1871).
9. 3 Tiffany, Real Property § 853 (3d ed. 1939).
10. G.L. & PJ.R.R. Co. v. N.Y. & G.L. R.R. Co., 134 N.Y. 435, 31 N.E. 874 (1892).
11. Id. at 441, 31 N.E. 875.
12. Id. at 440, 31 N.E. 875.
13. See Clark, Licenses In Real Property Law, 21 Colum. L. Rev. 757 (1921).
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Not outside the scope of reasonable inference is the possibility that the
Court may have intentionally disregarded the question of privity of estate
between covenantor and covenantee. Thus, it may have simply indicated by
omission, that the test in future cases will be as stated as a continuous
succession of conveyances between the original covenantor and the party now
sought to be burdened. If this is so, then it would appear that the type of
privity required has been changed. Rather than requiring privity between the
originally covenanting parties, the New York courts will require that privity
of estate which normally flows from the conveyance of land by grantor to
grantee.
This apparent change of the privity requirement seems desirable and is
in accord with the view of a leading modern authority in this area.1 4 Clark
states that the requirement of privity is designed to furnish a connecting link
-between the parties.' 5 Since that is present because of the promise between
the covenantor and covenantee, the only remaining need is to justify the transfer
of the right or duty created by the promise. This is accomplished by requiring
a continuous succession of conveyances between the original covenantor and
the party now sought to be burdened. Previously, by requiring privity of estate
between the covenantor and covenantee, there arose the need for a conveyance
between the two parties. Professor Clark argues that a conveyance from
the covenantor to the covenantee, and then back, would fulfill the formality of
this privity requirement. 16 Although the New York courts are concerned with
undue restrictions on the alienation of land, .the privity requirement as previously formulated has no real effect, either to hinder or facilitate alienability.
This is so because, as previously indicated, a barren formality will suffice to
create privity of estate between covenantor and covenantee.
This decision seemingly eliminates the last vestiges of the requirement
of privity of estate between covenantor and covenantee still apparent in the
Neponsit case. If so, this case may herald future decisions in which the New
York courts will be concerned with the "intent and substantive effect of the
covenant, rather than its form."'1 In determining when a covenant may run
with the land, the courts will be free to ignore at least one formalistic and
technical question, i.e., is there privity of estate between the covenantor and
covenantee. They may instead regard the actual burden the covenant places
on the land, in terms of the financial burden it may seek to impose, and its
duration in time'l 8
DEsTRuc'~rmn.i

oE EASEMENTS IMPLIED IN GRANT

"An easement

. . .

is an interest in land existing independent of the fee

14.
1M.
16.
17.

Clark, Covenants and Interests Running With the Land 117 (2d ed. 1947).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Supra note 3 at 259, 15 NXE.2d 797 (1938).

18.

Supra note 2.

